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OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge: 
In 2003, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court grew 
troubled by the frequency of meritless professional 
malpractice claims filed in the state system.  To address that 
concern, the Court amended the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure to require malpractice plaintiffs or their attorneys 
to file a certificate of merit (“COM”) within sixty days of 
bringing suit.  Failure to comply conferred upon a defendant 
the right to have the action dismissed.  Five years after the 
COM regime was enacted, however, Justices of the Supreme 
Court grew concerned that it had the unintended consequence 
of requiring the dismissal of meritorious claims due to 
technical oversights by plaintiffs or their attorneys.  Thus, the 
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Court amended the Rules again, setting a number of 
conditions that had to be met before a defendant could seek 
dismissal of an action for failure to comply. 
We have previously held that the COM requirement is 
substantive state law that must be applied by a federal court 
sitting in diversity.  See Liggon-Redding v. Estate of 
Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011).  In this appeal, 
we consider whether one of Pennsylvania’s conditions 
precedent to dismissing an action for failure to comply with 
the COM requirement, fair notice to a plaintiff, is also 
substantive law.  We conclude that it is, and thus will reverse 
the judgment of the District Court.   
I. Facts and Procedural History1 
 In 2010, Appellee Dr. Miroslav Uchal performed 
laparoscopic adjustable gastric band surgery, a procedure 
intended to place a band around a person’s stomach to limit 
his food intake and help him lose weight, on Appellant Brian 
Schmigel.  The surgery went awry, however, and the band 
was left “free floating in his abdomen.”  App. 20a.  As a 
result, Schmigel not only failed to lose weight; he suffered 
internal scarring, limiting his options for similar surgeries into 
the foreseeable future. 
                                              
 1 In an appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review the 
allegations of the complaint and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Schmigel, the 
non-moving party.  See Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1011 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
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 With the benefit of the discovery rule, Schmigel filed 
suit against Uchal just inside Pennsylvania’s statute of 
limitations for professional malpractice actions.  Between the 
surgery and the initiation of the suit, Uchal had moved to 
Florida so that Schmigel, a resident of Pennsylvania, was able 
to sue in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.  
Schmigel’s attorney asked Uchal to accept service of the 
complaint,2 but Uchal declined.  Instead, realizing that no 
COM had been filed with the Complaint, Uchal waited out 
the sixty-day window in which a plaintiff may file a COM 
after initiating suit to sustain a malpractice action under 
Pennsylvania law, see Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1042.2-1042.10, and on 
day sixty-nine, filed a motion to dismiss.   
 The next day, Schmigel’s counsel filed an “answer” to 
the motion, which included the missing COM and an affidavit 
explaining that counsel had timely consulted with a doctor 
but, due to an oversight, had not prepared a COM.  In the 
briefing that followed, the parties disputed, among other 
things, whether Schmigel had substantially complied with the 
COM requirement, whether his failure should have been 
excused, and—because Uchal had not waited thirty days after 
giving notice of the deficiency to allow for cure before filing 
his motion to dismiss, which is one of the conditions 
                                              
 2 Schmigel’s attorney represented he made this request 
of Uchal in a sworn affidavit to the District Court and again 
before us in argument. 
5 
 
precedent to dismissal under Pennsylvania law—whether 
Uchal had the right to seek dismissal in the first place.3 
 The District Court granted the motion and dismissed 
the claim.  Schmigel v. Uchal, No. 14-358, 2014 WL 
3397669, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 11, 2014).  First, the District 
Court held, under our precedent, that Pennsylvania’s COM 
requirement was substantive law that a federal court must 
                                              
3 The briefing came about in an unusual posture.  Two 
days after Schmigel filed his “answer,” which was an attempt 
to quickly fix his failure to file the COM, Uchal filed a reply 
and Schmigel moved for leave to file a full memorandum of 
law in support of his previously-filed “answer.”  The District 
Court ruled that Schmigel’s “answer” was his response to the 
motion, but allowed him to file his memorandum as a 
surreply.  Thus, Uchal argued in his briefing before us that 
Schmigel waived his argument about the notice requirement 
by not fully developing his position until his surreply in the 
District Court.  At argument, however, Uchal conceded that 
we should address the issue on the merits in recognition of the 
unusual briefing schedule set by the District Court, along with 
the understanding that the doctrine of waiver is a 
discretionary one that “may be ‘relaxed whenever the public 
interest . . . so warrants.’” Barefoot Architect, Inc. v. Bunge, 
632 F.3d 822, 835 (3d Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Rogers v. Larson, 563 F.2d 617, 620 n.4 (3d Cir. 
1977)).  We agree, and will do so.  See Nuveen Mun. Trust ex 
rel. Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. WithumSmith 
Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 302 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[The 
Appellant’s] choice-of-law arguments involve issues purely 
of law, and given that they involve choice of law, the public 
interest weighs toward our consideration of them.”). 
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apply when sitting in diversity.  Id. at *3.  Second, the District 
Court found that neither of Pennsylvania’s equitable 
exceptions for allowing a late-filed complaint—substantial 
compliance and justifiable excuse—applied here.  Id. at *5-7.  
The District Court did not address at all Schmigel’s final 
argument, that Pennsylvania’s notice requirement as a 
condition of dismissal applied in federal court, so that Uchal’s 
failure to satisfy that condition precluded dismissal.  This 
appeal followed.4 
II. Discussion 
A. Pennsylvania’s Certificate of Merit 
Requirement 
 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recounted in 
Womer v. Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269 (Pa. 2006), the Supreme 
Court adopted the COM regime “in January of 2003, having 
determined that malpractice actions were being commenced 
in the Pennsylvania courts more frequently.”  Id. at 275.  
With that recognition came concern that state courts would be 
overburdened with “malpractice claims of questionable 
merit.”  Id.  Thus, the Court “devise[d] an orderly procedure 
that would serve to identify and weed non-meritorious 
malpractice claims from the judicial system efficiently and 
promptly.”  Id.  The COM requirement was born.   
                                              
4 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332.  We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Because the matter before us is a pure 
question of law, our review is plenary.  See Foster v. Nat’l 
Fuel Gas Co., 316 F.3d 424, 430 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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Rule 1042.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the centerpiece of the COM regime, requires that 
within sixty days of filing “any action based upon an 
allegation that a licensed professional deviated from an 
acceptable professional standard,” a plaintiff file a COM that 
states (1) “an appropriate licensed professional has supplied a 
written statement that there exists a reasonable probability 
that the care, skill or knowledge” of the defendant “fell 
outside acceptable professional standards and that such 
conduct was a cause in bringing about the harm”; (2) the 
claim is “based solely on allegations that other licensed 
professionals for whom this defendant is responsible deviated 
from an acceptable professional standard”; or (3) “expert 
testimony of an appropriate licensed professional is 
unnecessary for prosecution of the claim.”  Pa.R.C.P. No. 
1042.3(a)(1)-(3).  The purpose of the requirement is to create 
a reasonable, early barrier that all malpractice plaintiffs must 
meet: 
On the one hand, the presence in the record of a 
COM signals to the parties and the trial court 
that the plaintiff is willing to attest to the basis 
of his malpractice claim; that he is in a position 
to support the allegations he has made in his 
professional liability action; and that resources 
will not be wasted if additional pleading and 
discovery take place. On the other hand, the 
absence from the record of a COM signals to 
the parties and the trial court that none of this is 
so and that nothing further should transpire in 
the action, except for the lawsuit’s termination. 
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 Womer, 908 A.2d at 275-76 (internal footnote and 
citations omitted).   
 That ultimate consequence of the failure to comply—
termination of the suit—is effectuated in state court upon the 
filing of a praecipe with a prothonotary, who in turn enters a 
judgment of non pros.5  Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 1042.6-7.  As 
originally written, the ability to seek dismissal for failure to 
file a COM had but one explicit condition:  No dismissal 
could be entered if a plaintiff’s timely motion seeking to 
extend the sixty-day window was pending.  Pa.R.C.P. No. 
1042.6(a) (West 2003) (amended 2008).6   
B. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
Identifies a Problem 
 In Womer, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
encountered a situation substantially similar to the one we 
face today.  There, a plaintiff initiated a medical malpractice 
suit only months after the COM regime began and, within 
                                              
5 In state court, a judgment of non pros “effectively 
constitutes a dismissal of the cause without prejudice,” so 
long as the statute of limitations has not expired.  Stroud v. 
Abington Mem’l Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (E.D. Pa. 
2008); see also Haefner v. Sprague, 494 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1985). 
 6 The note accompanying the Rule described another 
condition, that the prothonotary could not enter a judgment if 
a COM had been filed late, but before the defendant had 
sought dismissal.  See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.6(a) note (West 
2003). 
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sixty days, served the defendant with an expert report from a 
doctor that stated the claim was meritorious.  908 A.2d at 
273.  The plaintiff or his counsel did not, however, actually 
file a COM.  Id.  Accordingly, as soon as the sixty-day 
deadline passed, the defendant filed a praecipe to dismiss the 
claim, and the prothonotary entered a judgment of non pros.  
Id.  As here, the statute of limitations had run, and thus a 
presumptively meritorious claim came to a precipitous end.  
Id. at 274.   
 Two days after the filing of the praecipe, the plaintiff 
sought to reopen his case, arguing that, among other things, 
his failure to submit the COM was a result of his counsel’s 
“oversight or mistake.”  Id. at 273.  Included with that filing 
was a COM that his lawyer had written the previous day.  The 
motion was denied, but on appeal the Superior Court reversed 
the trial court and reinstated the case.  Womer v. Hilliker, 860 
A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (unpublished table decision).  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then granted allocatur and 
reversed the Superior Court, terminating the plaintiff’s claim. 
 In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the consequence of failing to comply with the COM 
requirement was a harsh one—the lawsuit’s demise.  908 
A.2d at 276.  Thus, because the Court “always understood 
that procedural rules are not ends in themselves, and that the 
rigid application of [Pennsylvania] rules does not always 
serve the interests of fairness and justice,” it adopted two 
equitable exceptions to the requirement: substantial 
compliance and justifiable excuse.  Id. at 276, 279.7  The 
                                              
 7 Both exceptions have their origin in other parts of the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure: substantial 
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Court found, however, that neither exception was met in that 
case because the plaintiff’s counsel “did not [timely] file a 
COM, even one that was defective.”  Id. at 277.  As a result, 
while the plaintiff had a presumptively meritorious complaint 
supported by an expert report, and despite his attachment of 
the COM two days after receiving notice of the deficiency, 
his case was terminated. 
 Justice Baer, joined by Justice Castille, dissented, 
citing a number of cases for the proposition that “the courts of 
[Pennsylvania] have historically been loathe to put a litigant 
out of court on a potential meritorious claim for missing a 
filing deadline due to lawyer oversight,” and observing “there 
is also ample law in Pennsylvania abhorring the practice of 
entering a snap judgment in response to such a mistake.”  Id. 
at 282-83 (Baer, J., dissenting).  The dissent concluded that 
dismissal was in error because “within hours of being put on 
notice that he mistakenly did not meet all the technical 
requirements of the rule, [the plaintiff] moved to rectify that 
mistake and supplied the technically missing COM.”  Id. at 
282. 
 Justice Baer’s rationale quickly transitioned from 
dissent to rule, as it became the backbone of a significant 
change to the COM regime.  Specifically, in 2008, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court amended the Rules of Civil 
Procedure to add additional conditions precedent to a 
defendant’s dismissal of a case.8  As a result of those changes, 
                                                                                                     
compliance in Rule 126 and justifiable excuse in Rule 3051.  
See id. at 276, 279. 
8 The amendments changed the previous Rule 1042.6 
into Rule 1042.7, and the substance of the note from 2003, 
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a Pennsylvania malpractice defendant now may dismiss an 
action only if four conditions are met: (1) there is not a 
pending motion (a) for a determination that a COM is 
unnecessary in the first place or (b) seeking to extend the time 
to file a COM; (2) a COM was not filed before dismissal was 
sought; (3) the defendant has attached proof that he served 
notice of the deficiency upon the plaintiff; and, as is relevant 
here, (4) thirty days has elapsed between the notice of 
deficiency and the defendant’s attempt to terminate the 
action.  Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.7(a)(1)-(4).9  The purpose of the 
changes to Rules 1042.6 and 1042.7 was to, among other 
things, “address concerns that the . . . rules . . . provide[d] for 
the entry of a judgment of non pros where there has been no 
notice of intent to enter such a judgment.”  Pa.R.C.P. No. 
1042.6 explanatory cmt. (2008). 
 Justice Baer reflected upon the change in a later 
opinion: 
While my personal sentiments did not carry the 
day in Womer, the injustice sought to be 
                                                                                                     
that no dismissal could be entered if a COM had been filed, 
was added as Rule 1042.7(a)(2). 
 9 The Rules further specify two circumstances under 
which an action may be dismissed even without providing 
notice to a plaintiff, neither of which pertains to this case.  
See Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.6(b) (stating that a judgment of non 
pros may be entered without notice (1) if a court has granted 
an extension of time to file and the plaintiff still failed to 
comply, or (2) if the court has denied a motion to extend the 
time to file). 
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remedied was accomplished via a subsequent 
amendment to the civil procedural rules 
requiring a defendant to give a plaintiff a thirty-
day written notice of intention to file a praecipe 
for a judgment of non pros for failure to file a 
COM.  Once notice was provided, the amended 
rules afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to 
seek a determination by the court as to the 
necessity of filing a COM.  Thus, the harsh 
consequence arising from a plaintiff’s failure to 
file a COM was ameliorated with a fair rule of 
process. 
Anderson v. McAfoos, 57 A.3d 1141, 1154 (Pa. 2012) (Baer, 
J., concurring) (internal citations omitted); see also Keel-
Johnson v. Amsbaugh, No. 07-200, 2009 WL 648970, at *6 
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2009) (explaining that the new rules 
“severely limit[] the availability of non pros by permitting 
judgment only after ample notice to plaintiffs”).  
 In sum, Rule 1042.7 was specifically intended to 
codify Justice Baer’s dissenting view in Womer and to 
prevent the exact situation that confronts us today.  That is, 
were this case in state court, Schmigel’s claim would not have 
been dismissed because his attorney filed the COM as soon as 
he was notified of the deficiency and well within the thirty-
day window for cure.  We now must decide whether that 
condition precedent to dismissal applies equally to 
malpractice actions filed in federal court.   
C. Choice of Law Analysis 
Pursuant to the Erie doctrine, “[a] federal court sitting 
in diversity must apply state substantive law and federal 
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procedural law.”  Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 
158 (3d Cir. 2000).  “This substantive/procedural dichotomy 
of the ‘Erie rule’ must be applied with the objective that ‘in 
all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely 
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the 
outcome of the litigation in the federal court [will] be 
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the 
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State 
court.’”  Id. at 158-59 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).  This 
outcome determinative test, however, “should not produce a 
decision favoring application of the state rule” unless it 
furthers one of Erie’s “‘twin aims’: ‘discouragement of forum 
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the 
laws.’”  Id. (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 
(1965)). 
Consistent with these aims, we apply a three-part test 
to decide whether a state law or rule is substantive or 
procedural for Erie purposes.  See Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d 
at 262 (citing Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 158-61).  First, we 
“determine whether there is a direct collision between a 
federal rule and the state law or rule that the court is being 
urged to apply.”  Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 262.  If there is 
a direct conflict, and the federal rule is “constitutional and 
within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act,” we apply the 
federal rule and end our analysis.  Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 
159.  Second, “[i]f there is no direct collision,” we examine 
“whether the state law is outcome-determinative and whether 
failure to apply the state law would frustrate the twin aims of 
the Erie Rule to discourage forum shopping and avoid 
inequitable administration of the law.”  Liggon-Redding, 659 
F.3d at 262.  Finally, we consider “whether any 
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countervailing federal interests prevent the state law from 
being applied in federal court.”  Id.   
As set forth below, we conclude that Pennsylvania’s 
notice requirement, like the COM requirement itself, is 
substantive state law under Erie and therefore must be applied 
by a federal court sitting in diversity.  We base this 
conclusion on (1) our precedent addressing Pennsylvania’s 
COM rules and New Jersey’s analogous Affidavit of Merit 
(“AOM”) statute; and (2) an independent application of our 
three-part test under the Erie doctrine.  We address each 
rationale in turn.   
1. Our History with Pennsylvania’s 
COM Regime and New Jersey’s 
AOM Statute 
This is not the first time we have addressed the 
requirement that a malpractice plaintiff provide a certificate 
or affidavit of merit, and we are guided by our precedent in 
Chamberlain, 210 F.3d 158-61 and Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 300-
310, analyzing New Jersey’s AOM statute; and Liggon-
Redding, 659 F.3d 258, addressing Pennsylvania’s COM 
regime.  That precedent supports the notion that the COM 
regime’s notice requirement should be construed as 
substantive law. 
In Chamberlain, we examined New Jersey’s AOM 
statute, which, like Pennsylvania’s COM requirement, 
provides that if an AOM is not filed within sixty days of 
filing a malpractice suit that action may be dismissed with 
prejudice.  N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27, 29; Chamberlain, 210 F.3d 
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at 157-58.10  After conducting our three-step Erie analysis, we 
held that the AOM statute did “not conflict with the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure and must be applied by federal 
courts sitting in diversity.”  Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 157.  
We also concluded that a failure to apply the statute would be 
contrary to the twin aims of Erie because a meritless 
malpractice claim in federal court could not be ended at the 
same early stage as in state court, thus encouraging forum 
shopping by plaintiffs and unfairly exposing professionals to 
meritless claims.  Id. at 161.  Having identified no 
countervailing federal interest preventing the law’s 
application in federal court, we applied the AOM requirement 
as substantive law.  Id.  Most importantly for today’s 
purposes, however, we did not apply the requirement 
untethered from its conditions.  Instead, we applied the 
primary condition precedent to dismissal, i.e., that sixty days 
(or 120 days for good cause shown) must have passed from 
the time of suit without the production of an AOM, see id. at 
163, as well as New Jersey’s four exceptions to dismissal 
with prejudice, see Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 305.   
As one would expect, when faced with Pennsylvania’s 
COM rule soon thereafter in Liggon-Redding, we concluded 
that it also did not conflict with any Federal Rule, including 
Rules 7, 8, 9, 11 or 41(b); that it was outcome determinative; 
that failing to apply it would encourage forum shopping and 
result in inequitable administration of the law; and that no 
countervailing federal interest prevented its application in 
                                              
 10 New Jersey’s AOM statute provides for a sixty-day 
extension of time to file the AOM for good cause shown, and 
provides for dismissal with prejudice, rather than without.  
N.J.S.A. § 2A:53A-27, 29; Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 157-58. 
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federal court.  659 F.3d at 262-65.  And, as in New Jersey, 
because enforcing the rule without its consequence would be 
a rather pointless exercise, we also enforced Pennsylvania’s 
own penalty for failing to comply, along with its primary 
condition precedent—that a defendant may move to dismiss 
an action without prejudice only when sixty days have passed 
from the time of suit without the production of a COM.  See 
id. at 263. 
 Because we reversed on the ground that the pro se 
plaintiff in Liggon-Redding in fact had complied with the 
COM requirement, we had no need to consider 
Pennsylvania’s equitable exceptions of substantial 
compliance or justifiable excuse, nor did we determine 
whether the other conditions precedent to dismissing an 
action, including the notice requirement, were substantive 
law.  In fact, all of those additional conditions, save one—that 
a timely motion for an extension of time could not be 
pending—were not enacted until after the plaintiff in Liggon-
Redding initiated her suit.  See id. at 260 (stating the 
plaintiff’s COM was due on January 18, 2008); Pa.R.C.P. No. 
1042.6 (noting amendments adopted and effective on June 16, 
2008).11 
                                              
11 The changes to the Pennsylvania Rules were made 
effective on June 16, 2008, after the court had received 
briefing on the issue, but before it finally dismissed the case 
in October 2008.  See Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, No. 07-
4591, 2008 WL 4682617, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2008).  The 
court did not mention the amendments there, but even if it 
had, notice was not an issue, as the court in Liggon-Redding 
repeatedly provided notice to the pro se plaintiff.  659 F.3d at 
260-61. 
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 What Chamberlain, Nuveen, and Liggon-Redding 
reflect is that we have already applied as substantive law the 
COM requirement and its New Jersey analogue, along with 
each state’s consequence of failing to comply, and at least one 
associated condition precedent to dismissal.  Uchal, 
moreover, does not argue that we should ignore all the 
substance of Rule 1042.7, for it is that Rule which vested him 
with the right to dismissal in the first place.  Instead, he seeks 
to enforce only that portion of Rule 1042.7 that is favorable to 
him.  That is, he would have us apply a defendant’s right to 
dismissal for a plaintiff’s non-compliance with the COM 
requirement, but ignore the fact that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has vested a defendant with that right only 
when a plaintiff receives thirty days’ notice.12  Neither our 
case law nor common sense supports that approach.  Instead, 
they counsel that the notice requirement, as a condition 
precedent to dismissal, is substantive law to be applied, along 
with the COM requirement itself, by federal courts sitting in 
diversity. 
                                              
 12 Making his position more perplexing, Uchal stated 
at argument that at least one of Pennsylvania’s other 
conditions precedent to dismissal—that no motion was 
pending for a determination of whether a COM is actually 
necessary, see Pa.R.C.P. No. 1042.7(a)(1)—does apply.  
While we reach no conclusion as to whether that Rule is 
substantive law, we note the unreconciled conflict in Uchal’s 
position. 
18 
 
2. The Notice Requirement is 
Substantive Law 
 Uchal argues that, whatever we may glean from our 
precedent, the application of our three-part Erie test requires 
us to hold that Rule 1042.7’s notice requirement is 
procedural.  Specifically, he argues that (1) it is in direct 
conflict with the Federal Rules; (2) it is outcome 
determinative only in the most limited sense; and (3) the 
failure to apply it in federal court would not frustrate Erie’s 
twin aims.  Our independent analysis under this test leads us 
to the opposite conclusion. 
 First, we discern no conflict whatsoever between the 
substance of Rules 1042.6-7 and Federal Rules 7(b) and 
12(b).  Rule 7(b) “governs the application to the court for an 
order and requires that any application to the court be by 
motion.”  Liggon-Redding, 659 F.3d at 262.  Uchal argues 
that applying the notice requirement from Rule 1042.7 means 
that we must apply the procedure by which dismissal is 
accomplished in state court, that is, a filing of a praecipe with 
the prothonotary, and that because Rule 7 provides for 
motions and not praecipes, the federal and state rules 
irreconcilably conflict.  
 We have already resolved this alleged conflict, 
however, and not in Uchal’s favor.  For when we held in 
Liggon-Redding that the COM requirement was substantive 
law that provided a defendant with a right to seek dismissal 
and did not present any conflict with Rule 7, we implicitly 
rejected the argument that the differences in the mechanism to 
accomplish that dismissal, i.e., a praecipe filed with a 
prothonotary in state court versus the filing of an appropriate 
motion in federal court, gave rise to any conflict.  Id. at 265; 
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see also Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 303 n.13 (concluding it was 
appropriate to file a motion for summary judgment to 
effectuate dismissal pursuant to the New Jersey AOM 
requirement).  The “conflict” urged by Uchal is therefore a 
false one, as the availability of motions practice in federal 
court to accomplish dismissal is unaltered by a requirement 
that federal courts adhere to Pennsylvania’s notice 
requirement as a condition precedent to that dismissal.  Yet 
again, “state policy can be effectuated without compromising 
any of the policy choices reflected in” Rule 7.  Chamberlain, 
210 F.3d at 160. 
 Nor is there a conflict with Rule 12(b), which tests the 
sufficiency of pleadings.  As we have made clear, the COM 
requirement “does not have any effect on what is included in 
the pleadings of a case or the specificity thereof.”  Liggon-
Redding, 659 F.3d at 263 (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  That is, the COM “is not part of 
the complaint, nor does it need to be filed with the 
complaint.”  Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 303.  Rather, the COM 
requirement and its conditions are facts that can form the 
basis for a motion for summary judgment.  See id. at 303 n.13 
(“That the [New Jersey] affidavit is not a pleading 
requirement counsels that a defendant seeking to ‘dismiss’ an 
action based on the plaintiff’s failure to file a timely affidavit 
should file a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, 
and not a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 
Rule 12(b)(6).”).  Because a motion for summary judgment 
can be filed whenever appropriate, there is no conflict 
between the timelines of the COM requirement, including 
thirty days’ notice, and a defendant’s right to terminate a 
plaintiff’s case for the failure to comply.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56 (“Unless a different time is set by local rule or the court 
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orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary 
judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all 
discovery.”).13  Uchal’s argument for a conflict with Rule 12, 
based on the twenty-one day deadline for filing a motion to 
dismiss, is therefore a non-starter.  Rather, “these Federal 
Rules and the [Pennsylvania Rules] can exist side by side, 
‘each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without 
conflict.’”  Chamberlain, 210 F.3d at 160 (quoting Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1980)). 
Second, failing to require notice is plainly outcome 
determinative, as it was for Schmigel here.  Indeed, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court altered the COM Rules 
specifically because the Court wished to avoid the 
termination of meritorious actions when, “within hours of 
being put on notice that he mistakenly did not meet all the 
technical requirements of the rule, [a plaintiff] move[s] to 
rectify that mistake and supplie[s] the technically missing 
COM.”  Womer, 908 A.2d at 282 (Baer, J., dissenting).  
                                              
 13 A hypothetical demonstrates the logic of our 
precedent that a motion for summary judgment should be 
filed, rather than a motion to dismiss:  If a plaintiff files a 
complaint and serves a defendant the next day, the plaintiff 
has fifty-nine more days to file a COM.  The defendant, 
meanwhile, must file a motion to dismiss within twenty-one 
days.  The defendant could thus not use a motion to dismiss to 
terminate the action because his right to do so would not arise 
until thirty-eight days after his answer was due.  See Nuveen, 
692 F.3d at 303 (observing that the “temporal separation of 
the filing of the complaint and the [New Jersey AOM]” 
means that an AOM will often be filed “after the defendant 
files its answer”). 
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While Uchal concedes, as he must, the conclusive effect on 
Schmigel’s case of his failure to provide thirty days’ notice 
and opportunity to cure, Uchal argues that the COM Rules 
would be outcome determinative only in the rare case.14  The 
frequency with which this issue has arisen in district courts, 
however, belies Uchal’s argument.15     
                                              
 14 The Dissent, meanwhile, states that the general 
COM requirement from Rule 1042.3 is “of course” outcome 
determinative, with the consequence of failing to comply a 
dismissal without prejudice, so long as the statute of 
limitations has not run.  Dissent 2, 7.  Rule 1042.3, however, 
is outcome determinative only because another part of the 
COM regime—Rule 1042.7—mandates that outcome.  That 
is, district courts do not administer the consequence of the 
failure to comply based on federal common law, but instead 
on the consequence a state provides.  Compare Dissent 2 
(acknowledging the consequence for failing to comply with 
Pennsylvania’s COM requirement is generally dismissal 
without prejudice), with Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 305 (stating the 
consequence of failing to comply with New Jersey’s AOM 
requirement is dismissal with prejudice).  As noted above, 
however, Rule 1042.7 provides that in Pennsylvania that 
consequence is vested only upon thirty days’ notice to a 
plaintiff.  
15 See, e.g., TranSystems Corp. v. Hughes Assocs., Inc., 
No. 14-1541, 2014 WL 6674421, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 
2014) (declining to dismiss action when COM was filed 
seventy-one days after a complaint was filed and noting that 
“federal courts have frequently declined to dismiss cases 
pursuant to Rule 1042.3 where the plaintiff has timely cured 
the failure to file a certificate of merit by filing a certificate of 
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 Finally, consistent application of the COM 
requirement will ensure equitable administration in both 
federal and state courts and will prevent forum shopping by 
discouraging defendants from removing to federal court when 
faced with actions filed near the end of the statute of 
limitations.  Conversely, it would not only be inequitable, but 
irrational, to dismiss meritorious claims based solely on a 
                                                                                                     
merit after receiving notice of this deficiency from the 
defendant”); Moyer v. Berks Heim Nursing Home, No. 13-
4497, 2014 WL 1096043, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2014) 
(holding that dismissal would be inappropriate because 
“Plaintiffs filed a certificate of merit within 30 days of 
defendants’ motion to dismiss”); Fabian v. United States, No. 
13-1656, 2013 WL 5525647, at *2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2013) 
(“[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 2008 amendments to 
the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure affect the COM 
requirement in a substantive way by affording the plaintiff 
‘ample notice’ rights before the defendant is permitted to file 
the actual praecipe for entry of a judgment of non pros.”); 
Bellinger v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 12-2374, 2013 WL 
424886, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2013) (noting that Rule’s 
“notice requirement has been declared to be procedural and 
thus inapplicable in federal courts; accordingly, a defendant 
in federal court may move for judgment of non pros in a Rule 
12 motion to dismiss without prior notice”); Robles v. Casey, 
No. 10-2663, 2012 WL 382986, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2012) 
(declining to dismiss case when plaintiff filed COM eight 
days after defendant sought dismissal); Keel-Johnson, 2009 
WL 648970, at *6 (stating that “new Rule 1042.6 severely 
limits the availability of non pros by permitting judgment 
only after ample notice to plaintiffs”). 
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state rule, when that very same rule, specifically amended as 
a result of a virtually identical scenario to this one, prevents 
dismissal in state court.  And while we generally look to 
concerns that a plaintiff will forum shop, visiting the 
consequences of inequitable administration of the law upon a 
defendant, we may consider the reverse as well, where the 
equities require.  See Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 304-05 
(considering whether applying a New Jersey rule would 
provide a defendant “incentive to remove a case from state to 
federal court”).16   
  Because there is no federal interest weighing against 
applying the same notice requirement as the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, our Erie decision is a clear one:17  The 
                                              
 16 See also S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 311 (7th Cir. 1995) (“If a rule so 
favorable to plaintiffs is inapplicable in diversity cases, 
defendants in such cases will have an added incentive to 
remove a diversity case to federal district court, just as in the 
days before the Erie decision, when a more favorable 
substantive rule of federal common law might induce a 
defendant to remove a case from state to federal court . . . .”); 
Michael Steven Green, The Twin Aims of Erie, 88 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1865, 1874 (2013) (“[T]he forum shopping test 
is answered by considering whether the difference between 
federal and forum state standards would, ex ante, influence 
the plaintiff’s choice to bring the action in federal or state 
court (or the defendant’s choice to remove to federal 
court).”). 
17 We recognize that in Nuveen we held two 
protections provided by the New Jersey Supreme Court to be 
procedural, rather than substantive: a one-sentence “addition 
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condition of thirty days’ notice prior to seeking dismissal of 
an action for failure to comply with the COM regime is 
substantive and must be applied in federal court.  Uchal was 
therefore required to provide Schmigel with notice before he 
had a right to dismiss this action, and his failure to do so 
requires reinstatement of this action in the District Court.18 
                                                                                                     
to New Jersey’s Civil Case Information Sheet referencing the 
AOM Statute,” and an “accelerated case management 
conference” held within ninety days of the filing of the 
complaint, where the trial judge is to remind a plaintiff of the 
need to file an AOM.  692 F.3d at 300.  We held the addition 
to the civil cover sheet to be procedural because “the use of a 
particular form generally is a procedure of a state court, and 
the information provided to parties by a state court via its 
forms usually will not result in forum shopping.”  Id. at 304.  
We also held that the failure to hold an accelerated case 
management conference could not be outcome determinative, 
because even in state court, the lack of such a conference 
“will not prevent an action from being dismissed based on the 
failure to file a timely affidavit.”  Id. at 305 (citing Paragon 
Contractors, Inc. v. Peachtree Condo. Ass’n, 997 A.2d 982, 
987 (N.J. 2010)).  Thus, we concluded that “[t]he timing of a 
conference that will not affect the outcome of a proceeding is 
unlikely to promote forum shopping and will not result in an 
inequitable administration of the [AOM] Statute.”  Id.  This is 
a far cry from Rule 1042.7, which states that a claim may be 
dismissed only if the conditions of the Rule are met. 
 18 As an alternative grounds for reversal, Schmigel 
argues that he satisfied Pennsylvania’s two equitable 
exceptions for late filing: substantial compliance and 
justifiable excuse.  We have yet to apply those exceptions as 
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III. Conclusion 
 States are free to vest defendants with a mechanism to 
swiftly terminate unmeritorious malpractice actions, as 
Pennsylvania did.  But in Pennsylvania, that right does not 
vest unless at least one condition is met: thirty days’ notice to 
                                                                                                     
substantive law, but have applied New Jersey’s common law 
exceptions of substantial compliance, extraordinary 
circumstances and common knowledge.  See Nuveen, 692 
F.3d at 306, 308-10; see also Snyder v. Pascack Valley 
Hospital, 303 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2002) (reversing 
dismissal and allowing late-filed AOM under New Jersey 
equitable principles after an attorney “candidly concede[d] 
inadvertence in failing to file the affidavit of merit within the 
sixty-day period”); Newell v. Ruiz, 286 F.3d 166, 169-71 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  In response, Uchal accepts that Pennsylvania’s 
exceptions, based in Pennsylvania Rules 126 and 3051, see 
Womer, 908 A.2d at 276, 279, are substantive law, as well, 
see, e.g., Rogan v. Cnty. of Lawrence, No. 12-1375, 2013 WL 
4511316, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2013); Ramos v. Quien, 
631 F. Supp. 2d 601, 612 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Stroud, 546 F. 
Supp. 2d at 250-53, but argues that Schmigel satisfied neither.  
Because we reverse on other grounds, we need not decide the 
substantive nature of those exceptions or their application to 
the facts before us.  We note, however, the irony that Uchal, 
on the one hand, accepts that equitable exceptions apply from 
far-flung sections of the Pennsylvania Rules (and must accept 
our application of New Jersey common law protections 
limiting the effect of the AOM requirement, see Snyder, 303 
F.3d at 276-77), but objects, on the other, to the application of 
protections that are expressly set forth in the Rules pertaining 
to the COM regime itself. 
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a plaintiff.  That right and its attendant condition of fair notice 
are each substantive law.  Accordingly, the District Court 
erred in dismissing Schmigel’s claim, and we will reverse and 
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
SCHMIGELv. UCHAL 
No. 14-3476  
          
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:       
 Rule 1042.7 regulates procedure, as does Rule 12 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Nothing could be 
clearer than the principle that a federal procedural rule “is 
valid in all jurisdictions, with respect to all claims, regardless 
of its incidental effect upon state-created rights.”  Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 
393, 410 (2010) (plurality opinion).  The majority ignores this 
principle, and its holding runs afoul of Supreme Court 
precedent and our own caselaw as well.  I disagree with the 
majority’s decision to incorporate state court procedural rules 
into our federal practice and, as a result, I dissent.  
  
 To begin, I would recast the facts of this case, as I 
believe they have been mischaracterized.  Uchal performed a 
laparoscopic adjustable gastric band procedure on Schmigel 
on May 10, 2010.  Schmigel did not lose weight after the 
surgery.  On March 27, 2012, another physician performed a 
CAT scan and discovered that the band was never placed 
around Schmigel’s stomach.  Schmigel filed a negligence 
cause of action against Uchal in federal court two years later 
on March 19, 2014—only eight days before the statute of 
limitations was set to expire.1  Jurisdiction was based on 
                                              
1 This presumes that Schmigel was entitled to application of 
the discovery rule, that his prior failure to lose weight did not 
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diversity of citizenship.  Schmigel failed to attach a COM to 
his complaint or to file one within 60 days of filing.  Uchal 
declined to waive service of summons, which he was entitled 
to do.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d).  Schmigel complains that 
Uchal “refused to waive service of summons, to enter an 
appearance, or to take any action whatsoever that might alert 
Plaintiff of a readily curable and honest mistake.”  (App. 66.)  
But Uchal had no obligation to notify Schmigel of his error.  
Schmigel did not cause the summons to be issued until May 
6.2  On May 27, Uchal filed a motion to dismiss based on the 
lack of COM.  In other words, Uchal filed a timely motion to 
dismiss “within 21 days after being served with the summons 
and complaint.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).  Uchal 
complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; he had 
no obligation to file a motion to dismiss earlier than the 21-
day deadline imposed by the federal rules.  The District Court 
granted the motion, as Schmigel had not filed a timely COM 
and failed to show substantial compliance with the COM rule, 
or extraordinary circumstances excusing his failure.  Because, 
by that time, the statute of limitations had run, Schmigel was 
out of court.  This was not a snap judgment of non pros 
without notice—as Rule 1042.7 was designed to prevent.  But 
for Schmigel’s tardiness in filing and serving the complaint, 
he would have been notified of his failure by the motion to 
dismiss and had an opportunity to rectify his error, contest the 
applicability of the COM rule, or re-file his action. Schmigel 
                                                                                                     
notify him of Uchal’s negligence, and that his cause of action 
did not accrue until March 27, 2012. 
2 The District Court docket does not reflect when he actually 
served Uchal.   
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is attempting to rectify circumstances of his own creation:  he 
waited until eight days before the statute of limitations 
expired before filing his complaint, he waited 48 days to 
obtain a summons, he did not file a COM within 60 days of 
filing his complaint, and he chose to file in federal court.   
 
 The majority strains to save Schmigel’s case by 
incorporating the “condition of thirty days’ notice prior to 
seeking dismissal of an action for failure to file the COM 
regime” as substantive law that must be applied in federal 
court.  (Majority Op. 23-24.)  Specifically, the majority 
incorporates the state court rule that “[t]he prothonotary, on 
praecipe of the defendant, shall enter a judgment of non pros 
against the plaintiff for failure to file a certificate of merit 
within the required time provided that . . . the praecipe is filed 
no less than thirty days after the date of the filing of the notice 
of intention to enter the judgment of non pros.”  Pa. R. C. P. 
No. 1042.7(a)(4).  Is this not, clearly, a procedural rule that is 
inappropriate to incorporate into federal practice?   
 
 My analysis confirms that the answer is “yes.”  The 
first step in determining whether a state rule applies in federal 
court is assessing whether the state rule contravenes federal 
procedural rules:  “First, a court must determine whether 
there is a direct collision between a federal rule and the state 
law or rule . . . . If there is a direct conflict, the federal court 
must apply the federal rule and reject the state rule.”  Liggon-
Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 262 (3d Cir. 
2011).   
 
 In this case, there is a direct conflict.  The majority 
holds that Uchal had no “right” to “seek dismissal in the first 
place” because he “had not waited thirty days after giving 
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notice of the deficiency to allow for cure before filing his 
motion to dismiss.”  (Majority Op. 4.)  But Uchal filed his 
motion to dismiss within 21 days after being served with the 
summons.  How could he give 30 days’ notice before filing 
his motion when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
mandate that he must file a motion to dismiss within 21 
days?3  Schmigel even acknowledges that “a motion to 
dismiss, rather than a praecipe for entry of judgment of non 
pros, is procedurally appropriate.  This may, arguendo, 
indicate that there is a direct collision between . . . Pa. R. Civ. 
P. 1042.7 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”4  
(Schmigel Reply 11.)   
 
 The Federal Rules do not require defendants to give 
written notice of their intention to file a motion to dismiss.  
Nor do they preclude courts from entering judgments without 
such notice.  Rule 12 only requires defendants to file either an 
                                              
3 The majority asserts that there is no timing conflict between 
the 21-day requirement under Rule 12 and the 30-day notice 
requirement under Rule 1042.7 because Uchal's motion 
should have been considered a motion for summary 
judgment.  But Uchal did file a motion to dismiss and he had 
to do so within 21 days.  Is the majority saying that a motion 
to dismiss was not available as a procedural mechanism to 
Uchal?  Does Rule 12 not apply in this case?  I suggest that 
this apparent confusion cautions further against our 
incorporating the state rule into our federal rules.   
4 Schmigel made this statement because he was advocating 
for the adoption of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 
1042.6, not 1042.7.   
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answer or a motion, not a notice of intent to file a future 
motion.  Rule 12 controls because its scope is “‘sufficiently 
broad’ to . . . implicitly, to ‘control the issue’ before the 
court.”  Burlington N. R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 4-5 
(1987) (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 
749 (1980)).  Rule 12 need not explicitly state that defendants 
are not required to provide notice of intent to dismiss because 
it so states by implication.  It does not require notice and our 
Court cannot add a notice requirement to a rule that plainly 
has none.  Moreover, adding such a notice requirement will 
create varied dismissal procedures, which will negate “[o]ne 
of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules,” which is “to 
bring about uniformity in the federal courts.”  Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (quoting Lumbermen’s 
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)).   
 
 Importantly, the Supreme Court has specifically held 
that, when there is a rules conflict, even though a substantive 
state law applies in federal court, the procedural protections 
that accompany that particular state law do not apply.  In 
Shady Grove, the Supreme Court held that a class action 
could be certified in federal court even though New York law 
prohibited the pursuit of such claims in a class action.  Shady 
Grove rejected the respondent’s argument that class 
certification abridged the “substantive right . . . not to be 
subject to aggregated class-action liability” conferred under 
New York law.  559 U.S. at 409.  Shady Grove held that Rule 
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs 
class certification, trumped the state law barring such actions.  
The plurality explained:  “A Federal Rule of Procedure is not 
valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in 
some cases and invalid in others—depending upon whether 
its effect is to frustrate a state substantive law (or a state 
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procedural law enacted for substantive purposes).”  Id.  As in 
Shady Grove, here the COM substantive rule applies, but the 
procedural rule does not.  
    
 Even if there were no conflict and we were to proceed 
with an analysis under Erie, Rule 1042.7 would still not 
apply.  Erie holds that a federal court sitting in diversity must 
apply state substantive law and federal procedural law: 
“Under Erie, a court assesses the substantive/procedural 
dichotomy with the objective that ‘the outcome of the 
litigation in the federal court [will] be substantially the same, 
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it 
would be if tried in a State court.’”  Nuveen Mun. Trust ex rel. 
Nuveen High Yield Mun. Bond Fund v. WithumSmith Brown, 
P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 302 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Guar. Trust 
Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).  “This 
‘outcome determinative test’ focuses on the ‘twin aims’ of 
discouraging forum shopping and avoiding ‘the inequitable 
administration of the laws.’”  Id. (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 
468).  We must ask whether applying the state rule “would 
make so important a difference to the character or result of 
the litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly 
discriminate against citizens of the forum State” or “would 
have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both 
of the litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to 
cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court.”  Hanna, 380 
U.S. at 468 n.9.  “Consideration of the ‘twin aims’ should 
produce a decision favoring application of state law only if 
one of the aims is furthered.”  Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 302.  Rule 
1042.7 satisfies neither requirement. 
 
 We concluded in Liggon-Redding that the COM 
requirement was outcome determinative because it made a 
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difference as to the character or result of the litigation.  Rule 
1042.3 “was created to ensure that professional negligence 
claims are meritorious, and the [COM] requirement prevents 
needless waste of judicial time and resources which would 
otherwise be spent on non-meritorious claims.”  Liggon-
Redding, 659 F.3d at 262-63.  The COM requirement exists to 
ensure that malpractice suits are meritorious.  That 
requirement is, of course, substantive and outcome-
determinative and creates no conflict with federal procedural 
rules.  Rule 1042.7 has nothing to do with the character of the 
litigation and is, accordingly, not outcome-determinative.        
    
 Because not applying Rule 1042.7 would doom 
Schmigel’s suit, the majority reasons that Rule 1042.7 is 
“outcome-determinative.”  However, as the Supreme Court 
said in Hanna, to some extent, “every procedural variation is 
‘outcome-determinative,’” but state court procedural 
variations do not automatically apply in federal court simply 
because the plaintiff will be out of court.  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 
468.  Rather, as noted above, it is the effect on the character 
or result of the litigation that is the key.  In Hanna, the 
Supreme Court held that federal, not state, procedural rules 
governed service of process in a diversity case, even though 
applying the state court rules would have determined the 
outcome.  It noted that “having brought suit in a federal court, 
a plaintiff cannot then insist on the right to file subsequent 
pleadings in accord with the time limits applicable in state 
courts, even though enforcement of the federal timetable 
will . . . result in determination of the controversy against 
him.”  Id. at 468-69.  The majority states that “were this case 
in state court, Schmigel’s claim would not have been 
dismissed because his attorney filed the COM as soon as he 
was notified of the deficiency and well within the thirty-day 
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window for cure.”  (Majority Op. 12.)  That is not what 
outcome determinative means.  Moreover, Schmigel chose to 
file suit in federal court, thereby being subject to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  If he wanted the benefit of state 
court procedures, he should have filed his action in state 
court. 
 
 Schmigel argues that ruling in Appellees’ favor will 
result in inequitable administration of the law.  But we have 
already rejected a virtually identical argument regarding 
procedural protections for plaintiffs who forget or are 
unaware of the affidavit of merit requirement in New Jersey, 
which is similar to Pennsylvania’s COM requirement.  In 
Nuveen, the appellant “argue[d] that the two protections the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has established to dull the severe 
consequences of the failure to file a timely affidavit of merit . 
. . are substantive requirements . . . that must be applied in 
federal court.”  Nuveen, 692 F.3d at 300.  In Nuveen, we 
rejected this argument because “plaintiffs (and their 
attorneys) are required to know the law. They should not need 
to be reminded of the affidavit requirement.”  Id. at 304 
(footnote omitted).  Furthermore, we held that “the lack of a 
reminder does not result in inequitable administration of the 
[Affidavit of Merit] Statute.”  Id. at 304 (emphasis added).  
We also noted that “[i]f Nuveen’s counsel had been diligent, 
it would not have needed a reminder . . . that it had an 
obligation to serve affidavits of merit.”  Id. at 310.  Nuveen 
dictates the result here.  As noted above, Schmigel’s counsel 
was anything but diligent in many ways.  Instead of requiring 
basic attorney diligence, the majority fashions new law 
contravening our precedent.   
 
9 
 
 Schmigel also argues that refusing to apply Rule 
1042.7 would encourage forum-shopping because plaintiffs 
would avoid federal court for fear of having their cases 
dismissed for inadvertent errors.  This argument makes no 
sense.  It is implausible that a plaintiff would be aware that 
federal courts have different dismissal procedures for failure 
to file a COM and still forget to file a timely COM.  Rule 
1042.7 fails the Erie test.  Denying Schmigel’s appeal is not 
inequitable and would not result in forum-shopping.   
 
 State court procedural rules do not belong in federal 
court.  I respectfully dissent. 
